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Abstract: In this paper I analyze early 
Heidegger’s concept of history. First, I argue 
that early Heidegger makes use of three distinct 
concepts or spheres of history, namely (1) 
history as intergenerational process, (2) history 
as personal or autobiographical development, 
and (3) history as the real center and origin of 
all intentional acts in the intentional self. Se-
cond, I argue that an essential motif in 
Heidegger’s discussion is the re-appropriation of 
what he considers the externalized and expro-
priated historical reality in all three spheres. I 
suggest that this constitutes an objective paral-
lelism to similar moves in Marx and neo-Marxist 
thought, especially Lukács and the Frankfurt 
School. I show that Heidegger is on his way 
towards an ethics of time. First, in opposition to 
theoretical historicism and historical aestheti-
cism or determinism of his time, early 
Heidegger advocates the active historical partic-
ipation in history, the engagement in one’s 
historical situation or praxis. Second, in opposi-
tion to the publically regimented and reified 
time frames, calendars and interpretations, 
Heidegger argues for the self-reflexive, histori-
cal shaping of one’s very own and unique life-
time. Third, because Heidegger finds the origin 
of all history in the historical enactments of 
intentions in the intentional self, he ultimately 
argues for the self-reflexive acknowledgment of 
this ultimate historicity at the very heart of 
human intentionality, calling for the always 
renewed accentuation of this inevitable and 
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Resumen: En este artículo analizo el concepto 
de historia de Heidegger. Primero, argumento 
que el Heidegger temprano hace uso de tres 
conceptos distintos, o esferas, de historia, a 
saber, (1) la historia como proceso de interro-
gación, (2) la historia como desarrollo personal 
o autobiográfico y (3) la historia como el centro 
real y origen de todos los actos intencionales en 
el yo intencional. Segundo, argumento que un 
motivo esencial en la discusión de Heidegger es 
la re-apropiación de lo que considera la exter-
nalización y expropiación de la realidad históri-
ca en las tres esferas. Sugiero que esto consti-
tuye un objetivo paralelo al de movimientos 
similares en Marx y el pensamiento neo-
Marxista, especialmente Lukács y la Escuela de 
Frankfurt. Muestro que Heidegger está en este 
mismo camino hacia una ética del tiempo. Pri-
mero, en oposición al historicismo teórico y al 
esteticismo histórico o determinismo de su 
tiempo, el Heidegger temprano defiende la 
participación activa en la historia, el compromi-
so con la propia situación histórica o praxis. 
Segundo, en oposición a los marcos tempora-
les, calendarios e interpretaciones regimenta-
dos y reificados, Heidegger defiende la auto-
reflexión y la formación histórica del tiempo 
vital de uno mismo. Tercero, porque Heidegger 
encuentra el origen de toda historia en las rea-
lizaciones históricas de las intenciones del yo 
intencional, defiende en última instancia el 
reconocimiento auto-reflexivo de la historicidad 
en el núcleo íntimo de la intencionalidad huma-
na, llamando a una siempre renovada acentua-
ción de esta inevitable y última historicidad 
como una condición necesaria de la temporali-
dad auténtica.   
 
 
Palabras clave: Husserl, Lukács, Adorno, 
Horkheimer, Historicismo, Soledad Transcen-
dental. 
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While it is not controversial that history looms large in Heidegger’s philo-
sophical work, it is less clear what Heidegger’s actual positions amounts to. Ex-
clusively focusing on the early writings by Heidegger, I want to explore the idea 
that Heidegger is motivated by the phenomenon of what, with Marx and Lukács 
in mind, we might call the expropriation of time and the struggle for regaining 
it. I do not believe that this is the only motif, nor do I claim that Heidegger was 
interested in Marx or Lukács. Heidegger’s reflections about the appropriation of 
time or history proceed along three different axes: (1) the historical agency in a 
historical situation, (2) the personal, autobiographical life story, (3) the primor-
dial or original historicity in the intentional self that enacts all life relations.   
 
 
PART I: HISTORICAL AGENCY VERSUS HISTORICISM 
 
Contrary to what many believe, Heidegger has never argued for historicism, 
let alone relativism. It is certainly true that Heidegger defends the break-
through towards the “historical worldview” in Dilthey and Yorck von Wartenburg 
(GA 64: 4). But it is important to realize that Heidegger is entirely unimpressed 
with Dilthey’s constant worry about the so-called “anarchy of systems” and the 
“relativism” inherent in historical consciousness. Heidegger interprets this worry 
as symptomatic for Dilthey’s substitution of an externalized, contemplative, and 
theoretical form of history (GA 59: 167) – what Marx and Lukács would call a 
mere reflection in objective thought – for the actual historical being on the 
ground, which is free from any doubts about the “relativity” of a historical 
event. In contrast to Dilthey’s contemplative and aesthetic historicism, 
Heidegger emphasizes the inevitably historical actuality of human life from in-
side, that is to say, the fact that as human beings we find ourselves in a partic-
ular historical situation, into which we are thrown, and which we transform and 
shape by and through our plans for the future, without aspiring to realizing 
some universal essence of humankind (Heidegger, 1993, 145). For Heidegger, 
“history” is not an inert being, an object that sits there to be contemplated, 
which might invite the meta-induction that what we assert now as true will be 
HEIDEGGER’S STRUGGLE WITH HISTORY 63 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 63 
 
overturned by future generations, as we have overturned the truths of past 
generations. Rather, for Heidegger history is what we shape through our ac-
tions and what affects us in the course of pursuing these actions. As humans, 
we cannot help but live in our particular historical situation. We interpret the 
past, and, in coming to terms with it, we open up a future for us. The human 
condition means to exist within a historical situation. Heidegger writes:  
 
One’s own epoch is experienced as a situation, in which the present time stands not 
only vis-à-vis the past, but also as a situation in which the future will or has been 
decided (Heidegger, 1993, 145). 
 
And Heidegger implicates philosophy in this historical decision making. Phi-
losophy does not stand above the historical strife. The “vocation” of philosophy 
is to sound the “wake up” call to seize one’s own historical situation (Heidegger, 
1993, 145). It is the task of philosophy to prepare “the appropriation” of “the 
[given] historical situation” (GA 61: 161). This by no means so different from 
Hegel, or Marx, or Lukács, or, for that matter, Adorno and Horkheimer.   
In fact, what early Heidegger calls the “hermeneutical situation” is actually 
a historico-practical category: it refers to the horizon of understanding in our 
own present time, which one needs to work through in order to project a co-
herent historical response. It is no wonder, then, that Heidegger defines philos-
ophy as “historical discovery,” historisches Erkennen (GA 62: 368).   
 
To the extent that philosophy has grasped the content and being-structure of its 
thematic object (the facticity of life), philosophy is “historical” discovery in a radical 
sense. (GA 62: 368)              
 
Factical life is historical life. And philosophy emerges from factical life and 
returns back to it. There is no extra-historical standpoint outside historical 
factical life. We are historical agents, not walking propositions with truth values. 
But unlike historicism, which reflects itself outside the historical situation, 
Heidegger urges us to fully immerse ourselves in the historical situation and 
shape our lives in the active response to this situation. Against the pessimism 
and taedium vitae of historicism, Heidegger opts for historico-practical en-
gagement, historical agency. As a historical agent, Dasein has no fixed es-
sence; it is temporality or historicity and openness towards the future, namely 
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on the basis of finding itself as a past, i.e., as that which has already been 
thrown into the world. As Heidegger puts it succinctly, “Dasein is history” (GA 
64: 86), which is quite different from saying that Dasein occurs “in” history. 
Just as death is something immanent to life and not some mysterious endnote 
to it, so history is an immanent happening in Dasein, according to Heidegger. 
Of course, one can deny the historical dimension of factical life, but it does not 
change the always historical reality of life.      
In short, against the historicist hypostatization of history as a force above 
and beyond us, Heidegger argues for the re-appropriation of history, namely by 
embracing our responsibility for our historical situation. There is an undeniably 
“activist” element in this, in contrast to the Platonic flight from, or the blind and 
deterministic submission to, history (which Heidegger associates with Speng-
ler), or the via media between these extreme poles (the neo-Kantian relation of 
transcendent values in the realization of historical forms) (GA 60: 38/39).     
However, Heidegger’s idea of historical activism stays clear of any volunta-
rism. Part and parcel of this concept of our historical situation is the idea that 
time or history constitutes an articulate unity that spans past, present, and fu-
ture. This unity crystallizes in the historical situation. After all, the historical 
situation emerges from the past, and is shaped through our present projects 
and thus transformed into our future. As historical agents we are participating 
in an overarching historical reality that connects past, present, and future. This 
has nothing to do with what in recent research has been thematized as the 
supposedly “non-sequential” view of time (Blattner, 1999). Heidegger does not 
argue that the past, present, and future exist “simultaneously.” Rather, his 
point is that any particular dimension of history or time (past, present, and fu-
ture) necessarily implies a reference to the other. Factical life is actually inte-
grated within an overall historical and always open trajectory; it is not 
nominalistically reduced to an isolated, naked existence in the “here,” “now.” 
Dasein is part of a tradition, but not captive to it, because Dasein takes up the 
tradition and interprets it in the present time and projects into the future. This 
“activist” conception comes with the emancipatory claim to take possession of 
the history or temporality that we “are,” rather than to continue to live in alien-
ation from history, by succumbing to either the aestheticism of historicism, the 
determinism of historical laws, or the reign of metaphysics and its love affair 
with a-temporal, unchanging truths, essences, etc. It is still not sufficiently rec-
HEIDEGGER’S STRUGGLE WITH HISTORY 65 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 65 
 
ognized that early Heidegger’s trademark anti-essentialism (in particular with 
regard to Dasein’s lack of any essence), and his decidedly anti-metaphysical 
stance are rooted in his concept of historical life that makes our historical situa-
tion and historical experience the primary reality. Much like the Young-
Hegelians and Lukács, Heidegger liberates history from its speculative super-
structure and re-appropriates it as historical praxis.            
 
 
PART II: PERSONAL HISTORY VERSUS THE TYRANNY OF PUBLIC TIME 
 
Historicism and historical determinism are not the only forms of alienation 
from our historical being. Blind historical enthusiasm constitutes the other ex-
treme. In throwing oneself head over heel into historical action at every price, 
oblivious to one’s personal historical rhythm and one’s very own life story, one 
abdicates or expropriates one’s own time for the demands of public time as 
such. But all forms of submission to public time, public schedules, is a form of 
temporal alienation and dispossession, according to Heidegger.          
Without dismissing our factical immersion within a tradition and an open 
historical situation and the historical action that is required, Heidegger argues 
that the real or original historical cell is the individual, personal or existential 
self. It alone is what is historical in a strict sense. In other words, unlike the 
just mentioned neo-Hegelians of his time, Heidegger does not start out from a 
collective or general subject, such as a nation, a state, let alone class con-
sciousness. In fact, for all his criticism of Dilthey, Heidegger follows Dilthey’s 
view, according to which the “individual” is the “original cell” [“Urzelle”] of life 
and history. For Heidegger, a historical situation is not, first and foremost, pub-
lic. Rather, it is characterized primarily by the personal perspective and person-
al investment that comes with a person’s existential engagement with his or 
her given historical situation within the context of the person’s own historical 
lifespan. Such a historical situation is given whenever we act within the world, 
and not only in the context of grand and memorable “historical” events which 
change the course of world history so called.                
In locating the historical spark within the individual and his or her existen-
tial experiences, public time and public events, or world-historical spectacles for 
that matter, become secondary or, worse, foreign impositions from outside that 
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sidetrack us from paying attention to our personal given historical situation at 
hand. In 1924 Heidegger observes:       
 
In most everyday things we do and have done to us, human life is geared towards 
time. It [human life, IF] is inherently regulated by time. There is time for work, 
meals, recreation, and diversion. The order of time takes a fixed and public form in 
calendars, timetables, class schedules, curfews, and the eight-hour day. (GA 64: 
17)  
 
Heidegger concedes that public time provides a much needed objective 
measurement in the context of living together with others. But he claims that it 
also subjects our lives to the techniques and commands of a temporal order 
which assigns us what to do at what time. Public time governs us; it dictates 
how we spend our own time. Temporal discipline is a public matter. Yet it is 
exercised and upheld by the individual subject that complies with the regulation 
of public time. It is no coincidence that Heidegger identifies das Man, the one, 
with time (GA 64: 76). 
        
In being-together-with-one-another everyone more or less adheres to the common 
“Then.” Each person has at the outset given away the “time” that he “has” in order 
to get it back in the form of the time regulated through our being-together-with-
one-another.” (GA 64: 76) 
 
Nothing could show better what Heidegger means by “self-alienation,” a 
term he frequently uses in his early writings. At bottom, it is temporal aliena-
tion. The time that I have, better, the time that I am – each one whiles away 
his or her own time, Jeweiligkeit (GA 64:45) – is subject to temporal rules and 
regulations over which I have no control. Through public time I am lived by the 
other, instead of living my own time. Yet public time is only “borrowed” time: it 
is my time that has been expropriated first and then handed back to me as an 
alien objectivity to which I must subject myself. Calendars and schedules are 
instituted in the past, but they govern the future. It is the temporal analogue to 
what, in the different sphere of economics, is the dominance of capital, which is 
nothing other than the accumulated labor of the past, which dominates, struc-
tures, and organizes labor in the present day, and beyond that, uses up the 
future for present purposes. Taking our cue from Marx here, we might call the 
rule of public time “the fetishism” of time, having its objective being in fixed 
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schedules, time tables, or clock time as such, while the underlying praxis of 
“fixing” time has been forgotten1.             
The oppressiveness of objective, public time is a fundamental theme in 
Heidegger, even after the mid 1920s. The category of “everydayness” in Being 
and Time is of course a temporal category: it signifies the dominance of “the 
monotony [Einerlei]” (GA 64: 75), “the crushing, crushing boredom” (Dreyfus & 
Kelly, 2011) of a flattened-out temporal order that takes its main cue from the 
endless repetition of the common, objective clock-time: the same 24 hours that 
will repeat themselves, day in, day out, turning everything new into “having 
already been there.” It is not a coincidence that Heidegger devoted half a lec-
ture series to boredom in 1929/30 (GA 29/30). Boredom, as marked by the rule 
of public time, manifests on the personal level of lived experience what histori-
cism is on the interpersonal level: endless repetition of the same.        
In fact, early Heidegger pays much attention to what we may call the pa-
thology of time consciousness. According to Heidegger, clinging to the past (as 
something “desired” right now) or pulling the future into the present (as some-
thing “useful” right now) are both modes in which time is organized around just 
one dimension: the present. What is repressed is “time” in its extended unity, 
which comes to the fore only if we let time be in its articulated structure of 
past, present, and future.    
In other words, not only can we mistake public, objective time for our own 
time, in which case we literally forget ourselves by not allowing time for us, we 
can also mistake our own time by clinging to just one dimension of it, the pre-
sent. Moreover, a distorted relation to time characterizes the whole project of 
metaphysics, because it glorifies what is always present, never comes into be-
ing, has no past to remember, or a future to expect. It is a grand manifestation 
of our tendency to foreground the present at all costs, the result of which is 
that we are walled up inside the prison of a never-changing present presence. 
And it is precisely this obsession with the permanent present which motivates 
the ascendancy of technology. It “promises” the constant and instantaneous 
availability of “the standing reserve” outside a past or future. Everything is al-
 
 
1 Simmel’s so-called “tragedy of culture” is based on the same idea. The original inter-subjective motive 
giving rise to various institutions sinks into oblivion and the sheer objectivity of the institution, decou-
pled from the interest it meant to serve, guarantees its enduring existence. As is well-known, Heidegger 
studied Simmel quite carefully.  
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ready opened up as what it is: raw material for use. Metaphysics and technolo-
gy increase historical entropy, as one would expect from closed systems.                 
But if we resist the leveling of “history” and follow Heidegger’s suggestion 
to understand “history” not by recourse to public, shared time, but with refer-
ence to our own personal time, our personal history, it follows that one’s partic-
ipation “in” world-history, or one’s role in a collective tradition, including one’s 
objective works, achievements, etc., all of which are governed by public or 
shared time, lose their role as individuating markers. What counts is how we 
live our own time, not how well we are placed relative to the temporal horizon 
of a tradition, the external standards of our national histories, or the feared or 
expected esteem in history books of posterity. The early Heidegger does not 
envision a new historical beginning, a new era, etc. Rather, the original histori-
cal dimension is always at work: in each Dasein.    
Personal history is not without its own temporal standards. Heidegger in-
sists that personal history must always be attentive to the whole of time, which 
prohibits the sacrifice of one dimension for the other, the downgrading of one, 
and the privileging of the other. The trick is always to keep in mind the whole 
of time, which assigns specific roles to the past and the future which cannot be 
realized by a presentist insistence on instant availability. According to 
Heidegger, the past is not a mere present that has moved into the no-longer. 
Rather, the past is its own dimension in which what is past unfolds its pastness 
to the full. As such, it is operative in what we plan for the future.        
 
The past is not a present time that has passed by; rather, the past’s being is set 
free only through its state of having been. The past reveals itself as that definitive 
state of one’s having been that is characteristic of futuralness, a futuralness which 
one resolves to embrace through grappling with the past. Authentic historicity is 
not a matter of rendering something present, but the state of being futural, in 
which one readies oneself to receive the right impetus from the past in order to 
open it up [i.e., the future]. (GA 64: 94) 
 
It is in this context of the unity of time that Heidegger also mentions the 
inevitable but as yet uncertain death that each one of us has to die at some 
point. It is precisely the openness of the future as genuine future (in its una-
vailability) that underscores his description of death. Moreover, mindful of the 
limits of time, Heidegger questions the philosophical enthusiasm to legislate for 
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future generations today (GA 64: 94). In the same vein, Heidegger questions 
the false quest after final and absolute truths. An ethics of time looks askance 
at all parading of so-called “final words” [Endgültigkeit] (GA 59: 84). If any-
thing, it favors what today we call “weak thought.” Early Heidegger searches for 
a humilitas temporalis, despite his penchant for resoluteness. Resoluteness is 
the precondition for having a fate, that is, the possibility of failure.             
In making personal historical experience of one’s own life the primary 
meaning of “history,” Heidegger does not give up the notion of collective history 
entirely. Rather, he re-calibrates it and grounds it in one’s own, personal histor-
ical being. The possibility of common historical action is subsequent to personal 
historical decisions that one takes in one’s life. But in committing oneself to 
goals or projects, one can then also share and communicate these ideas, and 
fight with likeminded fellows for the realization of these goals in society at 
large. But for Heidegger it is clear that the existential, personal self remains in 
the driver’s seat. No historical necessities govern it, unless, that is, it first abdi-
cates its freedom and historical responsibility – to the public, the party, the 
IMF, or whatever.      
 
 
PART III: TRANSCENDENTAL HISTORY 
 
Heidegger’s concept of history is ultimately predicated on his reading of 
Husserl’s theory of intentionality. According to Heidegger, all our intentional 
acts are performed or executed by what one might call the intentional self. It is 
the origin of all intentional acts and, as such, it is the ur-historical subject. For 
Heidegger, the Kantian I that must be able to accompany all my representa-
tions or the Cartesian cogito is not only a real being (with an ontology of its 
own), but also historical in the sense that it performs, remembers, and antici-
pates, and lives in its intentional acts. Strictly speaking, this intentional self is 
the only genuine, or original, historical “agent.” Because it temporalizes itself 
through the temporal structure of intentionality, it is time itself. Thus Heidegger 
writes: “In each case, Dasein itself is time” (GA 64: 57). All other empirical his-
torical developments are “derivative” relative to this ur-historicity of intention-
ality or the intentional self. This original history must not be conflated with the 
empirical history “in” which the individual person finds itself as an object, as 
something intended within the world.   
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Notwithstanding early Heidegger’s “official” stance against transcendental 
philosophy, he painstakingly differentiates between the personal self, as it ex-
ists within the environing- and with-world, and the intentional “inner” self that 
performs the intentional acts by which the world gains its meaning for the in-
tentional self (GA 60: 62-65). This intentional self is the one and only origin 
and paradigm for the meaning of history in early Heidegger’s thought (GA 59: 
84). Moreover, Heidegger holds that authentically performed intentional acts 
are acts which (1) accentuate and recall their origin in the intentional self 
(which is a basic kind of self-responsibility), and (2) contribute and set in mo-
tion the renewal of that self (thus keeping at bay the routinization and leveling 
of intentional acts in everydayness and their insertion in the environing world) 
(GA 59: 75). Behind this account of originary intentionality stands the ethical 
imperative to care for the self before all self-less object-knowledge. Only inten-
tional acts that foreground and renew the historicity of the intentional self are 
“authentic,” according to Heidegger. It goes without saying that this grounding 
of authentic action in the inner historicity of the intentional self and its own 
time comes at the price of a certain transcendental solitude, for the intentional 
self finds itself entirely singularized.                  
In his Theory of the Novel, Lukács speaks in a non-technical, yet quite 
evocative manner of the “transcendental homelessness” in modernity, the loss 
of a closed horizon. I submit that early Heidegger advances the complement to 
this: transcendental solitude. According to Heidegger, Dasein, taken as an in-
tentional ur-historical subject, is possessed by it alone in its intentional acts. It 
is singular: it is the time in which each and every thing is apprehended, where-
as it is not contained in that time. All intentional acts point back to this center 
of intentionality, which is just another way of saying that all intentionality is 
ineluctably self-referential2. The intentional self, however, is entirely cut off 
from other selves. On the ontological level, it is absolute singularity, the abso-
lute time which inheres in no other time. Heidegger writes: “I can never be the 
Dasein of others, although I may be together with them” (GA 64: 47).  
Dasein’s transcendental solitude or, what amounts to the same thing, its in-
tentional self-sufficiency is expressed and mirrored in the concrete history of an 
individual person, or what above we called the personal or autobiographical 
 
 
2 An excellent discussion of self-reference is to be found in Dan Zahavi (2005, 99-146).  
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history of a person within the world.  Compared to collective history, one’s own 
personal history is the closest shadow of the pure and untainted historicity of 
the intentional self, without which, however, there would not even be a world, 
let alone world-historical events. 




Early Heidegger thematizes his positive concept of history on three levels: 
1) the historical situation and historical agency, 2) the existential autobiograph-
ical history of a person, 3) the history of the intentional self. Schematically we 
can put this in concentric circles: 
                      
 
In the last analysis, there is a tension between the conception of historical 
agency in a historical situation, according to which Dasein, at least in part, is 
defined in terms of a shared, overarching effective historical reality, and the 
transcendental view at the centre, according to which the subject is absolutely 
separated from others by an unbridgeable existential gap, such that Dasein and 
its history is defined solely in terms of Dasein’s absolute singularity and self-
responsibility, without any intrinsic reference to others, let alone a reference to 
an overarching, shared historical horizon. It would be the task of another paper 
to show that this problem still haunts Being and Time in the ensemble of the 
basic descriptors of Dasein: facticity, fallenness, historicity, and authenticity. 
Regardless of that, however, we can say that all three concepts of history can-
vassed here have one unifying theme. Heidegger wants to re-appropriate histo-
Historical 
situation  
Personal Self  
Intentional 
Self   
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ry from its exteriorization in historicism, determinism, aestheticism, and re-
awaken us to historical self-responsibility in the face of the anti-historical ten-
dency in the entire Western metaphysical tradition and the aftermath of it in 
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